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1 Introduction
After more than thirty years of research, the theory of political business cycles (PBC s) 
spurred by Nordhaus (1975) has changed focus in several ways. The first change in focus 
results from the increased recognition that m onetary policy is not the m ain tool of election­
eering. That point is m ade by Drazen (2001), who stresses that the evidence to  support 
a m onetary policy-induced business cycle is weak. More precisely, there is no support to  
the idea that aggregate econom ic activity is boosted  before elections, at least not in OECD  
countries. A lt and Chrystal (1983) had already come to  that conclusion when surveying 
the earlier empirical literature, and Faust and Irons (1999) added more recent support to  
the same claim. The rejection of a m onetary-induced political business cycle (PBC ) does 
not m ean that the whole existence of political business cycles has been rejected. On the  
contrary, there is strong evidence of fiscal cycles. Namely, the debt levels have been found  
to  increase prior to elections in industrial countries by Alesina et al. (1992, 1993) or Alesina  
and Roubini (1990). Drazen (2001) em phasises that there is evidence of pre-electoral in­
creases in transfers and other fiscal policy instrum ents in several countries. In developing  
countries, there seem s to be even more support for political fiscal cycles. Evidence of op­
portunistic cycles in budgets and transfers is reported by Block (2002), Schuknecht (1996, 
2000), Shi and Svensson (2006), or Vergne (forthcom ing).
The groundwork for a theory of the political budget  cycle was laid by Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988) and Rogoff (1990). In their papers, incum bents use debt-financed public goods to  
signal their com petence and increase their reelection prospects. More recent contributions 
stressing the key role of fiscal policy include Drazen (2001) and Shi and Svensson (2006). 
A problem  w ith alm ost all of these m odels is that output is kept exogenous and feedback  
effects are ignored. Only Drazen (2001) allows a feedback effect of the budget cycle onto  
output through, adm ittedly, ad hocish m onetary policy in what he calls an active fiscal, 
passive m onetary policy (A FPM ) m odel.
A second shift in focus in the literature on political business cycles follows the more general
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departure of the m acroeconom ics literature from m odels based on fully rational behaviour. 
Near-rational behaviour has thus been m odelled by Akerlof and Yellen (1985)1 or Mankiw  
and Reis (2002). Near-rational behaviour may affect the aggregate because deviations from  
rational behaviour by m any individuals m ay add up. But it m ay also affect the aggregate  
because a policym aker counts on the m istakes m ade by individuals and adjusts her policy  
behaviour. The more individuals make m istakes, the larger should be the policy effect. 
There is no reason why near-rational behaviour should remain confined to  the econom ic  
realm. If some agents make their econom ic decision in a near-rational way, they should  
a fortiori make their political decisions in a near-rational way. In fact, the im pact of an 
individual agent’s vote is lim ited, and the incentive to  get informed is small. It is not 
surprising that agents hold biased beliefs on the econom y and econom ic policies, as Caplan  
(2002, 2006) docum ents. To our knowledge, the only attem pt so far to consider near-rational 
voters is Shi and Svensson (2006), who assum e that a share of the electorate is uninformed.
In this paper, we probe deeper in how near-rational behaviour affects the m acroeconom y in 
a political budget cycle setting. We construct a parsim onious fiscal policy m odel capturing  
deficits and transfers on the one hand and an opportunistic P B C -type m odel on the other 
hand. Voting behaviour is near-rational in the sense that a fraction of voters is not able to  
or does not bother to  acquire full inform ation about the actions of the policymaker. This 
tem pts the incum bent government to try to look more com petent than it is by providing  
individuals w ith large transfers, the level of which can be observed by everybody. Even  
though voters do not have full inform ation, they anticipate that the government tries to  
suggest higher com petence by increasing the level of deficit-financed transfer paym ents. 
Based on our m odel, we can show that an increase in the share of informed voters and an 
increase in politicians’ political rents raises the equilibrium level of transfers and deficits. 
Transfer and deficit cycles emerge.
1 They define near-rational behaviour as ’’behavior that is perhaps suboptimal but that nevertheless 
imposes very small individual losses on its practitioners [i.e. individual agents] relative to the consequences 
of their first-best policy. ... [It] can nevertheless cause first-order changes in real activity [i.e. in the 
aggregate]’ .
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We then extend the analysis by endogenising output. As in Drazen (2001), we m odel the  
fiscal policy effect via output on utility  in addition to  its direct effect on utility. Drazen pos­
tu lates an aggregate supply function and studies the effect of fiscal policy under alternative  
m onetary policies. By contrast, we propose a very general K eynesian dem and function. We 
consider expansionary and /or contractionary m ultiplier effects as well as fiscal policy effects 
under full em ploym ent versus boom  or slack. Up to  this point, we have considered a simple 
policy effect of near-rational individual behaviour: the policym aker adjusts transfers and 
deficits to  the inform ational deficiencies of individuals given a fixed level of output. Now  
we can also take the effect of government m anipulations onto output into account. As a 
consequence, the deficit level optim ally chosen by the government is affected in two ways. 
First, if deficit finance has a less expansionary or more contractionary effect onto output, a 
politically m otivated government prefers less deficit because the positive im pact of m anip­
ulations is reduced. Second, if an econom ic boom  is expected, the government responds by 
reducing the deficit level because the effect of deficit finance is smaller when the econom y is 
already som ewhat overheated. The political transfer cycle is dam pened, i.e. the government 
acts anticyclically, compared to a situation w ithout a boom . We obtain two intuitive and 
testable predictions. We are, however, not aware of empirical studies on these issues, be 
they supportive or contradictory.
It is instructive to compare this paper more closely w ith Rogoff (1990) and the theory part 
in Shi and Svensson (2006). All three papers are inspired by R ogoff’s (1990) critique of 
the traditional PBC literature logic. Rogoff points out that rational voters should not let 
their expectations about postelection performance be influenced by preelection budgets. All 
three paper m odel the voting outcom e, more plausibly, as a function of voters’ expectations  
about the candidates’ performance after  elections. In Rogoff (1990) the political budget 
cycle is caused by the incum bent’s ability to  observe her own com petence before the general 
public. Here and in Shi and Svensson (2006), the political budget cycle is produced by an 
inform ation asym m etry between private agents which affects the public’s overall perception
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of the policym akers’ com petence. A share of the population is uninformed because they  
shy away from acquiring inform ation that is costly or, as Shi and Svensson suggest, because  
their access to  inform ation is restricted. In this sense, we and Shi and Svensson assume 
some near-rationality due to an inform ation asym m etry.2 In two other respects, this paper 
is different to  both Rogoff (1990) and Shi and Svensson (2006). First, it responds to the  
empirical finding that it is m ainly transfers that are increased in pre-election years. Thus, 
we focus on political transfer cycles, whereas Rogoff (1990) and Shi and Svensson (2006) 
m odel the public goods provision. Second, we capture the interdependence between output 
and deficit/debt, whereas output is exogenous and constant both  in Rogoff (1990) and in 
Shi and Svensson (2006).
In sections 2 and 3, we present the basic m odel and its solution. We will show that trans­
fer cycles depend on the share of uninformed voters and on the m agnitude of the rent the  
incum bent receives from staying in power. Section 4 extends the m odel to  incorporate the  
interrelation between (determ inistic or stochastic) output and rational political m anipula­
tions of deficits and transfers by policymakers. Section 5 concludes w ith a sum mary of the  
findings and suggestions for future research.
2 Transfer M odel
In this m odel, every second period an incum bent politician and a challenger representing  
different parties run for office. If both  are purely opportunistic, voters’ utility, however, 
does not hinge on econom ic considerations alone, but also on a more or less strong personal 
predisposition or sym pathy for one of the candidates.3 The utility  function for any voter i
2 In contrast, Rogoff’s (1990) information asymmetry has nothing to do with near-rationality because 
there individuals could not even potentially choose to obtain the information earlier and achieve the first 
best optimum.
3 Henceforth the terms voter and individual (agent) are used interchangeably. Similarly, the terms 
politician and policymaker are also used as synonyms. Furthermore, we associate the incumbent with party 
a and the challenger with party b without limiting the generality of the analysis.
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reflects both  econom ic and non-econom ic components:
Ui  =  £  [a, +  a P z , } .  (1)
s=t
The econom ic com ponent a, (consum ption) and the sym pathy com ponent 9iz s are additively- 
separable w ith relative weight a  in each period. D iscounting between periods could be 
added, but does not contribute to substance nor exposition. U tility  derived from sym pathy  
is constrained to  9iz s =  [— 2, 2] since zt is either — 1 (when party a is elected) or +  2 (when  
party b is elected); and the personal sym pathy param eter 9i is uniformly distributed over 
the interval [—1 ,1].4 The sym pathy com ponent represents any attribute of the candidates 
that does not affect econom ic policies, be it their stance on societal issues or their good  
looks. As in Shi and Svensson (2006), there are two kinds of voters. Informed voters ob­
serve all variables in the economy, uninformed voters can only observe a subset.5 Both  
politicians j  =  a,b  face a similar utility  function as voters consisting of an econom ic and a 
non-econom ic com ponent. The non-econom ic com ponent is, however, the political rent X t 
that policym akers receive from being in power:
Vj  =  £  [a, +  Xs]. (2)
s=t
V oters’ and po liticians’ consum ption alike are constrained by each agent’s net-of-tax incom e  
y t and transfers t t :
at =  yt +  tt. (3)
The government budget constraint is
t t =  D t  — R (D t - 1) +  n't, (4)
4 If individual i has somewhat more sympathies for party a, say at 0l =  — 2, then her utility derived 
from sympathy is positive (1), if party a is elected (z  =  — 2); but it is negative ( — 1), if party b is elected1 4 2 4
(zi =  2 ).
5 This is explained at the end of this section. Confer the paragraph on the timing of events on page 7.
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where D  m easures debt, R  depicts repaym ent, and n is the incum bent’s com petence. Trans­
fers are determ ined by the policym aker in power. They are intertem poral transfers, not 
incom e redistribution. They allow more government subsidies or benefits. Transfers are 
deficit-financed, i.e. it depends on debt minus repayment. (Repaym ent function R  is as­
sum ed to  be positively sloping and convex w ith R (0) =  0.) However, the tota l am ount of 
transfers also depends on incum bent politician j ’s com petence in period t, n't .6 Com petence  
n't consists of skills shocks for this period and for last period. Each skills shock is a random  
variable w ith m ean 0, distribution function F (•)  and density function f  ( • ) . Past shocks are 
com m on knowledge, but current or future shocks are unknown to  both  policym akers and 
private agents. One-period com petence persistence is m odeled as an M A(1) process:7
nt =  +  t á - i .  (5)
Instead of equation (4) a fuller fiscal m odel could be used, but results are identical. In that 
case, let variable y t be gross incom e and t t depict net transfers, i.e. t t is negative and the  
absolute value of t t represents taxes minus transfers. Taxes would be used to  finance a fixed 
am ount of public goods. The question would then be: how much can we reduce the tax  
burden by deficit finance?8
The tim ing of events is as follows. In period t , the incum bent sets deficit level D t , thus 
providing transfers for the public according to equation (4). Voting individuals observe
6 For nj > 0, (net) transfers t would surpass the net deficit, Dt — R(Dt_ i ). In a developing country, we 
could interpret nj as the government’s ability to secure foreign aid, which does not have to be repaid. In 
any country, it may also reflect its ability to seize and exploit profitable investment opportunities.
7 Limited persistence is a compromise. It allows some persistence, but acknowledges that competence 
also changes over time as new tasks for politicians emerge. The model would also work without persistence,
i.e. nj =  Mj, but would not be easily solvable for persistence longer than 1 period. Rogoff’s suggestion of an 
MA(1) process is one of two conditions for splitting the model into separate 2-period cycles (each consisting 
of an election period and an off-election period) as is so common in this literature. Confer the discussion of 
deficit repayment in the off-election period in the paragraph on the timing of events on page 7.
8 A recent example is the discussion about a previously abolished commuter tax relief (Pendlerpauschale) 
in July 2008 in Germany. For obvious political reasons some politicians, especially from the Bavarian CSU 
party, which faced an upcoming election, wanted to reintroduce this tax relief at the expense of achieving 
a balanced budget sooner rather than later.
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transfer level t t and past skills shock ^j- 1 . Only informed voters observe D t , uninformed  
voters do not. This assum ption simplifies the reality of hidden accounts and disguised  
inform ation about government finances.9 Informed voters can deduce current skills , and 
can, therefore, extract inform ation about the future com petence of the incum bent, which the  
uninformed voters cannot. Then, informed and uninformed voters cast their vote based on 
their different inform ation sets. W hat m atters is that some voters are im perfectly informed. 
Given that the probability of being pivotal is alm ost zero, there is no incentive for becom ing  
informed by gathering costly inform ation in order to improve on e’s electoral choice. In 
period t  +  1, the winner (incum bent or challenger) takes office. Voters do not m atter any 
more because they cannot vote in period t  +  1. Politicians want to repay the previous period  
deficit because the deficit is costly10 and voters cannot sanction the policym aker for reducing 
transfers, i.e. effectively levying additional taxes, to  finance deficit repayment. Individuals 
anticipate in election period t  that politicians will repay the deficit in the off-election period  
t + 1 .
3 M odel Solution
The m odel is solved in three steps. First, we can determ ine the probability that an individual 
agent votes for the incum bent, to  whom  we refer to as party a, w ithout loss of generality. 
Second and on this basis, we can derive the probability for the incum bent to  win the election
9 Prima facie, it may seem strange that a fraction of voters should be uninformed about the deficit or, 
at least, ignore the deficit in their economic considerations. Since the Maastricht criteria at the latest we 
are used to extensive discussions of deficit levels and deficit reduction strategies. However, some countries 
managed to manipulate their deficit numbers prior to the start of the European Monetary Union, for instance 
by falsifying their figures or hiding social security debt. Furthermore, remember that deficit levels were, at 
least in many European countries, of little concern in the 1970s and early 1980s. In developing countries, it 
is even more obvious that a fraction of society is not informed and/or does not incorporate deficit numbers 
into their economic calculations.
10 Repayment is guaranteed, technically, because the marginal utility of additional deficit (through its 
1-for-1 effect on transfers and, finally, on consumption) is 1 (given that the discount factor is 1), whereas 
the marginal cost (R'(D)) and, therefore, the marginal disutility is greater than 1. The unity marginal 
utility assumption is also used by Shi and Svensson (2006) for the same purpose as here, albeit with respect 
to the public goods consumption. -  With less restrictive assumptions, we could get a rising trend in debt.
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for a given level of transfers, which depend on the deficit level and the com petence level of 
the incum bent. Third, we can m axim ise the incum bent’s expected utility  over any 2-period  
cycle, i.e. period t  u tility  plus period t  + 1  utility  in case of winning the election m ultiplied  
by the probability of winning (as determ ined in step 2) plus period t  +  1 utility  in case 
of losing m ultiplied by the probability of losing. Assum ing exogenous incom e, we derive 
the first order condition (FOC) to characterise the optim al level of deficit. In the the next 
section we relax the exogenous incom e assumption.
In the first step, we consider an individual voter. She will vote for incum bent a , if
E t [a“+i +  a 0%(- - )] >  E t [ab+i +  a ^i( + 2 )] . (6) 
'------------- V------------- ' '------------- V------------- '
exp. utility  when a in power exp. utility  when b in power
D epending on who is in power, t  +  1 consum ption will typically differ because of differences 
in policym akers’ com petence11 and individuals’ expectations about it:
E t [at+i ] =  E t [yt+ i] +  E t [ti+ i]; E t [ab+ i] =  E t [yt+ i] +  E t [ti+ i]; (7) 
t t+i =  —R ( D t ) +  nt+i. (8)
Period t  +  1 government budget constraint (8) says that the period t  deficit m ust be repaid  
in period t  +  1.12 As a result, t  +  1 transfers are negative (taxes) corresponding to  deficit 
repayment m odulo the effect of the policym aker’s com petence. Individuals have no idea  
about the skills shock of either policym aker in t  +  1. Nor do they know the skills shock of 
the challenger in period t. However, they can use the incum bent’s period t  deficit policy to  
draw conclusions about her skills shock in period t .
Et[tbt+ 1] =  —E t[R (D t*)]. (9)
11 We assume here that output does not depend on which policymaker is in power, an assumption we 
shall relax in section 4.
12 Remember that policymakers will not borrow in period t +  1 because there is no election at the end of 
that period. Confer the discussion in the paragraph on the timing of events on page 7.
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E,[i?+i] =  —E t[R(D,*)] +  E W ] , (10)
where D^ denotes the equilibrium  level of deficit, which also corresponds to the incum bent’s 
optim al period t  choice for the deficit (to be determ ined further down). Com bining equations
(6) to  (10) we obtain a condition for an individual to  vote for incum bent a:
Et[wt] >  a d i . (11)
Using the distribution of the skills shock we can determ ine the probability (P r) of an 
individual voter, informed or uninformed, to  vote for incum bent a :
P r [E t[K] — a 0 i >  0] =  E,[W?I . ( , a )  =  ^  +  1 . (12)
a  — (—a ) 2a  2
In step 2, we determ ine the probability Prob  that incum bent a obtains 50% of the votes 
in period t  elections. It is the probability that the number of voters tim es their individual 
probability P r  to  vote for incum bent a (as determ ined in equation 12) is greater or equal to
2. However, the individual probability P r  is different for informed and uninformed voters 
because their expectations of period t  skills, E t [Wt ], are different. Hence
Prob { a  [E M  +  1] +  (1  — a ) [  E M  +  1] >  . ( 1 3 )
' L 2a  2  v ; L 2a  2 J “  2 ' V '
'--------- V--------- ' '----------'
informed uninformed
So why is there a difference in expectations for informed and uninformed voters? Consider 
the government budget constraint for period t :
tt  =  d , +  nt (14)
Rem em ber that policym akers will not borrow in off-election periods because higher transfers 
and appearing more com petent does not affect the duration of the incum bent’s tim e in office.
10
W ithout debt in off-election period t  — 1 there is no repayment in election period t. Equation  
(14) can be rewritten as follows:
Vt =  tt  -  Dt
E t [V“] =  V<t =  t t -  D t -  V t - i  (15)
The point is that informed voters can determ ine E t [vt] determ inistically, because they can 
observe D t . B y contrast, uninformed voters m ust form an estim ate of the incum bent’s skills, 
Vtt, based on their estim ate for the deficit level, D t :
Vt =  t t -  D t -  V<t - i  (16) 
or D t =  tt  — Vt -  Vt- i  
Vt =  t t -  D t -  Vt- i  + D t -  D t (17)
'--------- v--------- '
^  from (15)
E  [Vt] =  Vt  +  D t  -  D t  (18)
Using equations (15) and (18) we can now determ ine the probability that incum bent a 
receives 50% of the votes in period t:
T. Ì f X  1n , +  D t -  D t L  1 ]
Prob +  2 ] +  (1 -  2a  ‘ +  2 ] >  2 }
=  Prob f  ^  +  (1 -  a ) D t  -  Dt  +  -  >  - 1
I 2a  v ; 2a  2 >  2 |
=  Prob >  (1 -  a ) ( D t -  D t ) \  (19)
=  1 -  F [(1 -  a ) ( D t  -  Dt)],  (20)
where F (•)  is the distribution function of the skills shock.
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In step 3, we can m axim ise incum bent a ’s utility  over the entire election cycle, i.e. periods 
t  and t  +  1. Period t  +  1 u tility  is the sum of the utilities for w inning and losing the election  
weighted by the probability determ ined in step 2:
m axD t E t { y t  +  Dt  +  nf  +  X }
+ e , { |1  — F [(1 — a ) ( D t — d ,)]]  [yt+i — R (D t) +  nf+i +  X ]}
'--------------------- v--------------------- '
prob. incum bent wins 
+ E t{ |F [(1 — a ) (D t — D t )]] [yt+i — R ( D , )  +  nf+i]} (21)
' ------------------v------------------ '
prob. incum bent loses
Assum ing constant incom e and the incum bent’s knowledge about her past, but not her 
present and future skills (and not the skills shock of the challenger), the m axim isation  
problem  looks as follows:
m a x Dt y  +  Dt  +  Wt- i  +  X  
+ y  — R ( D t)
+  [1 — F  [(1 — a ) ( D t  — D t)]]X  (22)
Differentiation w ith respect to  D t  produces the following FOC:
1 — R'(Dt)  +  (1 — a ) F  ;[(1 — a ) ( D t  — D t)]X  =  0 (23)
We argued before that both  informed and uninformed private agents anticipate that the  
government tries to  cheat. Thus D t* =  D t =  D t is an equilibrium  condition. Inserted into 
the FOC, we obtain:
1 +  (1 -  a ) f  [0]X =  R ( D \ )  (24)
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A pplying total differentials to  the FOC tells us what affects the optim al level of borrowing. 
We obtain the following perturbation results w ith respect to political rent X  and share of 
informed voters a:
dD* dD*
d T  > 0 d T  < 0 (25)
Higher political rents and more uninformed voters increase optim al borrowing. Intuitively, 
if the ego rent of being in power increases, then the incentive to  distort the econom y also 
increases. The incum bent will be more willing to  increase debt to  appear more com petent in 
the eye of voters. Furthermore, increasing the share of informed voters reduces the efficiency 
of electioneering because fewer voters can be fooled before elections.
4 E ndogenising O utput
It is one of the weaknesses of Rogoff (1990) and Shi and Svensson (2006) as well as this 
paper thus far that output is kept exogenous. Let us now account for the interdependence  
between defic it/debt and output. We postu late a very general form ulation, which allows a 
deficit-financed fiscal policy to produce both  expansionary and/or contractionary effects. In 
each period, we assum e transfers to  have a linear effect on output:
yt  =  y  +  btt (26)
Coefficient b could be interpreted as m ultiplier, but, a priori, it could be positive or negative. 
Of course, it is m ost likely that there is some positive effect in the period when the deficit 
occurs and some negative effect in the repayment period. Inserting equations (14) and 
(8), respectively, we obtain the following output equations (w ith bi =  b2 and both  positive  
typically):
yt  =  y +  bi (D t +  nt) 
yt+i  =  y +  b2 ( R ( D t) +  nt+i) (27)
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Incorporating the output effect of deficit finance into the analysis affects the individual’s 
choice of who to  vote for (step 1), but not the probability that incum bent a receives 50% of 
the vote (step 2). Instead of (22) we now obtain the following m axim isation problem:
+ y  — (1 +  b2)R(Dt)
+  [1 — F  [(1 — a ) ( D t  — D t)]]X (28)
N ote that the exogenous output case discussed in section 3 is a special case w ith  bi =  b2 =  0. 
Instead of (24) the first order condition becomes:
We still obtain that the incum bent’s optim al D  depends positively on the ego rents X  and 
the share of uninformed voters 1 — a,  but we can also obtain perturbation results for the  
m ultipliers bi and b2:
the contractionary effect decreases), the government will optim ally choose to  increase the  
level of deficit. If a tool is more effective, it is optim al to  use it more. The second result 
concerning b2 is the analogue. If the negative effect of deficit repayment on future output 
is increased (or the positive effect reduced), a politically m otivated government will borrow  
less. Overall this m eans that, if deficit finance becom es more contractionary, be it in t  or 
t  + 1 ,  the deficit and transfer cycle will be less pronounced. We can also compare our results 
to  those obtained for exogenous output. If deficit finance has, overall, a positive effect, the  
government will exploit the situation and exacerbate the cycle.
(1 +  bi) +  (1 — a ) f  [0]X =  (1 +  b2 ) R ' ( d ;  ) (29)
(30)
If the expansionary effect of deficit finance on current output (measured by bi ) increases (or
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In a second extension, we would like to capture the effect of a shock on the deficit and transfer 
cycle. The output function m ust be changed in two ways. First, any shock augm ents or 
reduces y. Second, any shock will affect the im pact of deficit financed transfers on output, 
i.e. the multiplier. If the econom y is already overheated, a further deficit financed im pulse  
should be less expansionary. Conversely, under a negative output shock the econom y should  
benefit more from stim ulated output. B oth changes to output function (27) can be expressed  
as follows:
y t =  y +  E ( ^i) +  bi —^[Dt +  nt]
y +  E  (ei)
yt+i =  y +  E ( £2) +  b2 — , r [ R (D t) +  nt+ i] (31)
y +  E  ( 2^)
Again, the individual’s choice of who to  vote for (step 1) is affected, but not the probability  
that incum bent a receives 50% of the vote (step 2). N ote that both  the exogenous output 
case and the previous extension are special cases of this extension. We now obtain the  
following FOC:
(1 +  bi E (—) ) +  (1 — a ) f [0]X =  (1 +  b2 -  +  E (—) )R '( D t ) (32)
y +  E  (ei ) y +  E  (^ )
The previously obtained results continue to be valid. But we can now also consider the  
effect of expected output shock on the political deficit and budget cycle. It does, however, 
not m atter for the optim al deficit choice by the incum bent, if the output shock will actually  
occur or not.
dD  dD
<  0 — —r >  0 (33)
d E t(e i) d E tfo )
If policym akers think there will be a positive output shock in period t  or a negative output 
shock in period t  +  1, then a politically m otivated government should borrow less, because  
the expansionary effect of deficit finance is dim inished in a boom . Compared to a non-boom  
situation the policym aker behaves anticyclically.
15
5 C onclusion
This paper contributes to  the theoretical political budget cycle literature. We acknowledge 
and m odel the empirical findings that political business cycles are m ainly spurred by trans­
fers and deficits. Our m odel also allows us to endogenise output in a very general way. 
We find that political deficit and transfer cycles increase w ith the m agnitude of political 
rents, the number of uninformed voters, the overall expansionary effect of deficit finance on 
output, and the degree of slack in the econom y (anticyclical behaviour of polciym aker). All 
results are quite intuitive. To our knowledge of the literature, the latter two findings on 
the interdependence between endogenous output and optim al politically m otivated deficit 
finance have not yet been studied empirically -  or theoretically.
Our paper suggests at least two possible extensions. First, the interdependence between  
output and politically m otivated deficit finance could be em pirically investigated. Second, 
our behavioural assum ption about the uninformed voters could be varied, especially in 
light of the endogenous output extension. W hat happens, if uninformed voters do not 
fully understand the effect of deficit finance on output? W hat happens, if informed and 
uninformed voters have different expectations about future output shocks?
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